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This paper analyses the determinants of wealth inequality, measured as the share of wealth 
owned by the top 1% wealthiest individuals in the UK, the USA and France, using structural 
vector autoregression (SVAR) models for the periods of 1919-2014 and 1970-2014. We 
analyse the impact of technological change, globalisation, top marginal income and inheritance 
tax rates, labour's bargaining power, privatisation and homeownership on wealth inequality. 
Our results indicate that the only robust and significant determinant across all three countries 
is the bargaining power of labour – measured by union density in the UK and USA and 
collective bargaining coverage in France. We find that privatisation does significantly lead to 
higher top 1% wealth shares in the UK and France, although in the USA the effect is 
insignificant. Top marginal income tax rates lead to a decline in top wealth shares in the UK 
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The aim of this paper is to analyse what determines the recent rise in wealth inequality, 
measured as the share of the top 1% wealthiest individuals in total wealth. We analyse both the 
components of wealth inequality measured by differences in rates of return to wealth, saving 
rates, inheritance flows and income inequality, as well as the deep determinants of inequality 
driven by globalisation, technological change and institutional changes in industrial relations, 
taxation, homeownership rates and privatisation.  
We address three gaps in the literature. Firstly, regarding the components, we present a 
cross country empirical analysis to the ongoing debate as to whether wealth inequality results 
from higher rates of return to wealth for the top 1% or from other factors driving incomes and 
savings. On the one hand, Kuhn et al. (2019) argue that wealth inequality since the 1970s in 
the USA is determined by the differences in the rates of return to wealth reflected by a race 
between the return to stocks, which are held by the wealthiest households, and housing, which 
is held by the middle of the distribution. De Nardi and Fella (2017) present a review of general 
equilibrium models which argue that differential rates of return are necessary to produce the 
high top 1% wealth shares observed in the data. On the other hand, Saez and Zucman, 
(2016:563) and Mian et al. (2020:25) argue that since the 1970s, an increase in the share of 
income going to the top 1% wealthiest households and differential saving rates in the USA are 
the key components driving wealth inequality. Lieberknecht and Vermeulen (2018) find similar 
results for France.  
We contribute to this literature by estimating  the impact of differential rate of returns 
and top 1% income shares on wealth inequality using structural vector autoregression (SVAR) 
models for the period of 1919-2014 for three countries for which long-term time series data are 
available, the UK, the USA, and France, extending the empirical analysis beyond the focus on 
the USA.1 While we find that differential rates of return do increase wealth inequality in the 
USA, consistent with the literature above, this result does not hold for UK and France, where 
the effect is statistically insignificant. On the other hand, we find that a positive shock to top 
1% income shares significantly leads to an increase in wealth inequality in all three countries. 
Secondly, the existing literature on wealth inequality has largely ignored what we refer 
to as the deep determinants of wealth inequality. One exception is Piketty (2014) who discusses 
the role of technological and institutional changes on wealth inequality, albeit based on a 
largely descriptive rather than econometric analysis. This is in stark contrast to the literature 
on the causes of income inequality, where the relative importance of technological change, 
globalisation, labour’s bargaining power and taxation have been extensively analysed. Given 
that we find that the top 1% income share is a robust determinant of wealth inequality, the 
second contribution of this paper is to synthesize these two strands of research on inequalities 
in income and wealth and empirically estimate whether the determinants of income inequality 
also impact wealth inequality. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to empirically 
estimate these deep determinants of the top 1% share of wealth across the three countries.  
Our key result is that direct measures of the bargaining power of labour, measured by 
union density and collective bargaining coverage, are the only robust determinants of wealth 
inequality across all three countries and across all specifications. In the UK and the USA, we 
use union density as the indicator of labour’s bargaining power given their decentralised 
 
1 To the best of our knowledge there is no analysis on the causes of wealth inequality in the UK -a country showing similar 
trends to the USA. The sample period in some estimations start at 1970 due to data availability for some explanatory variables. 
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bargaining regimes. In France however, due to its centralised bargaining regime, we use 
collective bargaining coverage to capture bargaining power. Quantitatively, shocks to labour’s 
bargaining power explain 42%, 11% and 32% of the variation in top wealth shares in the UK, 
the USA and France respectively.  
Thirdly, we also address two further deep determinants that primarily relate to wealth 
rather than income inequality, namely homeownership rates and the privatisation of public 
assets. While we find that homeownership rates do not have a significant impact on the top 1% 
wealth share in any country, we find that privatisation does significantly lead to higher top 1% 
wealth shares in the UK and France, although in the USA the effect is insignificant. We argue 
that this cross-country difference could be explained via differences in the impact public 
spending has on the bargaining power of labour, due to the different composition of public 
spending in the USA versus the UK and France. Top marginal income tax rates lead to a decline 
in top wealth shares in the UK but are insignificant in the USA and France, and we failed to 
find a significant effect of top marginal inheritance tax rates in any of the countries.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section two provides a theoretical 
overview of the components of wealth inequality and how they relate to the deep determinants 
discussed above. Sections three and four discuss the data and estimation methodology. Section 
five presents the estimation results and section six concludes.  
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
We first derive the components of the top 1% wealth share from an accounting 
framework before discussing the deep determinants and the relationship between the two. 
Building on the accounting framework used by several papers (Saez and Zucman, 2016; Kuhn, 
Schularick and Steins, 2018; Lieberknecht and Vermeulen, 2018; Smith et al., 2019; Mian, 
Straub and Sufi, 2020) wealth 𝑊𝑡+1 
𝑓
 of fractile 𝑓 (e.g. the top 1% wealthiest households) in 
















 is pre-tax personal income, 𝑠𝑡
𝑓
 is the saving rate and ℎ𝑡
𝑓
 is the net inheritances, 
gifts and inter vivos transfers for fractile 𝑓. These refer to synthetic rather than actual values, 
as it does not account for the fact that over time the top 1% is made up of different individuals 
entering and leaving the group.2 
Personal income for fractile 𝑓 is the sum of capital income 𝑌𝐶,𝑡
𝑓
 and labour income 𝑌𝐿,𝑡
𝑓
 
where capital income is given by the product of previously accumulated wealth and the rate of 


















2 The approach of (Saez and Zucman, 2016; Kuhn, Schularick and Steins, 2018) is therefore to think of the saving and rate of 
return for fractile 𝑓 as synthetic rates, which will approximate the actual average rates of the top 1% so long as the households 




The rate of return on wealth, 𝑟𝑡
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 is the proportionate change in the real price of asset 𝑗 (deflated by the consumer 




𝑓   is the share of asset 𝐴𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑓
 in 
total wealth owned by fractile 𝑓 in the previous period. We assume that capital income is earned 
on the wealth accumulated in the previous year.  
As we have seen, a key debate in the literature is whether wealth inequality is 
determined by a race between the stock market and the housing market or by other shocks to 




𝑓 for all the countries in our estimation 
and we only have long run data on the returns of housing and equities, we simplify the analysis 
by making three assumptions. Firstly, we assume that there are only two assets in the economy 
- equities and housing. Secondly, we assume that over time the composition of assets held by 
fractile 𝑓 changes in line with the population as a whole.3 Lastly, we assume that the top 1% 
hold all their wealth in stocks, while the population as a whole on average hold all of their 
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Lastly, we integrate both inheritance and income taxes into the model. We first decompose the 
saving rate into the saving rate out of post-tax income 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑡
𝑓
 and average income tax rate across 
all income sources 𝑇𝑦
𝑓


























.  Taking data from the UK, this assumption is relatively justified. Between 2015 
and 1971, the aggregate share of housing assets as a percentage of total net personal wealth has gone up from 42% to 70%. 
For the wealthiest 1%, housing share has gone from making up 10% of wealth to 30% of wealth over the same period.   
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We then decompose net inheritance, gifts and inter vivos transfers into the post-tax net transfers 
ℎ𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡
𝑓
 and average inheritance tax rate across all transfers 𝑇ℎ
𝑓





𝑓 (1 − 𝑇ℎ
𝑓) (8) 
 
Rearranging, we can write the law of motion for top wealth shares i.e. the ratio of wealth held 
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   and is a negative function of 𝑟𝑡, 𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡. We focus on the four 
main factors.  
A positive shock to differential rates of return (𝑟𝑡
𝑓
− 𝑟𝑡), all else being equal, leads to 









. All else being equal, a positive shock 
to differential rate of returns increase the top 1% share of personal income (differential rate of 
return channel).4  




, all else being 
equal, leads to an increase in top wealth shares as the wealthiest households earn more labour 
income and increase their top 1% share of personal income (personal income inequality 
channel).5  
A positive shock to differential saving rates (𝑠𝑡
𝑓
− 𝑠𝑡) , all else being equal, increases 
the top 1% share of wealth. As shown in equation 7, differential saving rates are a positive 
function of differential saving rates out of post-tax income and a negative function of 
progressive income taxes6 (differential saving rate channel). 
Lastly, a positive shock to top 1% net inheritance, transfer and inter vivos flows as a 




 leads to an increase in the top 1% wealth share. As shown in 
 
4  On the other hand, the impact of a shock to the capital share of income on wealth inequality is ambiguous and depends on 
who is losing labour income and who is gaining capital income as can be seen in equation 5. If an increase in the capital share 
of income leads to a rise in 𝑌𝐶,𝑡
𝑓
 that is in absolute terms greater than a decline in 𝑌𝐿,𝑡
𝑓
 , personal income inequality will increase, 
and all else being equal, so will wealth inequality. If an increase in the capital share of income leads to a decline in 𝑌𝐿,𝑡
𝑓
that is 
in absolute terms greater than the rise in 𝑌𝐶,𝑡
𝑓
, then both personal income inequality and wealth inequality will decline. Lastly, 




at all, i.e. is only due to redistribution between capital 
and labour income within the 99%, has no impact on the top 1% share of personal income or the top 1% share of wealth.  
5 The personal income inequality channel also includes any changes due to capital income inequality, part of which will be 
captured by differential rate of returns.  
6 From equation 7,  𝑠𝑡
𝑓 − 𝑠𝑡 = (𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑡
𝑓 − 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑡) − (𝑇𝑦
𝑓 − 𝑇) where 𝑇𝑦
𝑓 − 𝑇 is the difference in average tax rate of fractile 𝑓 
and the average tax rate of the whole economy. The greater (𝑇𝑦
1% − 𝑇) the more progressive the income tax system.  
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equation 8, net inheritance, transfer and inter vivos flows are a positive function of post-tax 
flows and a negative function of progressive inheritance taxes (top 1% inheritance channel).  
How do the deep determinants of inequality driven by globalisation, technological 
change and institutional changes relate to this framework? The contemporaneous causal 
relationships between the deep determinants and components of wealth inequality are 
summarised in Figure 1 below. Firstly, technological change leads to an increase in top 1% 
income shares through either labour-saving automation which increases the capital share of 
income or skill biased automation which increases wage inequality (labour saving and skill 
biased automation channel) (Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994; Berman, Bound and 
Machin, 1998; Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003; Goldin and Katz, 2007; Autor, Katz and 
Kearney, 2008; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Bassanini and Manfredi, 2014; Goos, Manning 
and Salomons, 2014; Autor, 2015). Financial and trade globalisation also increases income 
inequality through similar channels, with the additional effect of offshoring (offshoring 
channel).  
Labour market institutions, most notably trade unions and collective bargaining 
coverage, impact income inequality by increasing the bargaining power of labour vis a vis 
capital and/or managers (bargaining channel) (Ahlquist, 2017; Freeman and Medoff, 1985; 
Levy and Temin, 2007; Rosenfeld, 2014).7 Stronger labour market institutions can lower the 
capital share of income directly and lower wage inequality through reducing top managerial 
pay, in addition to influencing public policy and fairness norms around pay and renumeration  
(Daudey and Decreuse, 2006; Kristal, 2010; Stockhammer, 2017; Fichtenbaum, 2009; Kristal, 
2013; Stockhammer, 2009; Guschanski and Onaran, 2021; Frydman and Jenter, 201;0 McCall 
and Percheski; 2010). Trade and financial globalisation also impact income inequality by 
reducing the bargaining power of labour vis a vis capital by opening up the possibility to 
automate or offshore jobs in sectors that are historically the most unionised, such as 
manufacturing (Rodrik, 1998; Jayadev, 2007; McMillan and Harrison, 2007). 
Technological change, globalisation and labour’s bargaining power are also likely to 
impact differential rate of returns, as the return to equities are more responsive to automation 
and cross border financial flows, than housing returns which are not directly related to the 
sphere of production and tend to be more domestically focused (production channel). 
Technological change, globalisation and labour’s bargaining power also impact top 1% 
wealth shares via their impact on differential saving rates. An increase in financial assets, 
spurred on by technological change and globalisation, are increasingly held as assets by the top 
1% and liabilities by the rest of society, leading to a relative rise in the savings by the top 1% 
of the wealth distribution (financial-saving channel) (Mian, Straub and Sufi, 2020). However, 
technological change and globalisation may also have an opposite impact on differential saving 
rates, as they decrease the price of consumer goods, and therefore the average savings relative 
to the top 1% (consumer price channel). Moreover, labour unions and collective bargaining 
coverage are expected to decrease differential saving rates by increasing or protecting the 
private pensions of workers (pension channel) (Ebbinghaus, 2017).  
An increase in top marginal income tax rates decrease income inequality through three 
channels (Piketty et al, 2014): by decreasing the economic activity among the highest earners 
(supply-side channel); increasing the incentive to avoid tax and therefore decreasing declared 
incomes (measurement error channel) or by decreasing the rents extracted by high earners 
 
7 There is a large literature on how unions impact the dispersion of wages within the 99% which is less important for our 
analysis. See Farber et al. (2018) for an overview.  
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(bargaining channel). An increase in top marginal income tax rates also decrease differential 
saving rates, as it reduces the post-tax income of the top 1% (progressive income tax channel). 
An increase in top marginal inheritance tax rates on the other hand reduces wealth inequality 
by decreasing the net inheritance and inter vivos transfers to the top 1% as a ratio of aggregate 
wealth (progressive inheritance tax channel).  
Homeownership rates impact top wealth shares via differential rate of returns by 
increasing the proportion of housing in aggregate wealth8 and therefore increasing the capital 
gains and rents to the holders of housing wealth, who tend to be in the bottom 99% (composition 
channel) (Atkinson et al., 1978; Anderson, 1992; Hancock, 1998; Henley, 1998; Hamnett, 
2003; Bonnet and Bono, 2014; Rognlie, 2015; Fuller, Johnston and Regan, 2019; Pfeffer and 
Waitkus, 2019). An increase in homeownership rates also leads to higher average savings 
relative to the top 1%, and therefore lower wealth inequality, as households in the middle of 
the wealth distribution are more likely to increase their savings rate to get on the housing ladder 
(homeowner saving channel).  
The privatisation of public assets have competing effects on wealth inequality (Fessler 
and Schürz, 2015). A decline in public wealth may lead to lower wealth inequality via 
decreasing differential saving rates, as the bottom 99% save more due to a declining social 
safety net and the need to hold private wealth for precautionary reasons (precautionary saving 
channel). A decline in public wealth, however, may lead to higher wealth inequality if the top 
1% gain windfall financial returns on the newly privatised assets (privatisation windfall 
channel). Lastly, a decline in public wealth may increase wealth inequality as less public wealth 
leads to a decline in labour’s social wage and thereby bargaining power, as workers have lower 
outside options (bargaining channel). 
Lastly, income and wealth inequality can influence all the other variables in the system 
via a political channel, as economic wealth can be transformed into political power to shape 
the policies and norms in society towards the interests of the top 1%. Below we argue that this 
is not likely to occur contemporaneously, as it takes time for economic power to be turned into 
effective policy change.  
 




Table A1 and Table A2 in the online appendix present the variable definitions, data 
sources and summary statistics for the components and deep determinants of wealth inequality 
respectively. Both the share of net personal wealth held by the top wealthiest 1% of individuals 
and the share of pre-tax national income of the top 1% of the income distribution are based on 
data provided by the World Inequality Database (WID).9 The data on differential rate of returns 
(the real rate of return for stocks minus that for housing) comes from the Macro History 
Database (Jordà et al, 2019). The real rate of return for each asset is measured as the sum of 
 
8 In the discussion above we assumed that there was no change in the composition of wealth between the top 1% and the 
bottom 99%. Here we test this directly by controlling for changes in the homeownership rate, as a proxy for the change 
composition of wealth held by the bottom 99%. We focus on homeownership rates to link to the literature on whether extending 
homeownership impacts wealth inequality. 
9 This is the share of income going to the top 1% of the income distribution, rather than the top of the wealth distribution, as 
we do not have long run data on the latter variable. As Kuhn et al (2018, p. 53) shows the two distributions follow the same 
trend over time for the USA; we therefore follow the literature (Saez and Zucman, 2016; Lieberknecht and Vermeulen, 
2018) and use the top 1% share of the income distribution as a proxy.   
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the asset price inflation and yield return for each asset, deflated by the consumer price index. 
We do not have data for differential saving rates or inheritance flows to the top 1%; these 
components are captured by the direct shocks to wealth inequality as discussed below.   
Regarding the deep determinants, technological change is measured as the aggregate 
real ICT capital stock as a ratio to real value added based on data provided by the EU KLEMS 
for the period of 1970-2015. This variable has been used to capture both labour saving and 
skills biased technological in the literature on the determinants of capital income shares 
(Bassanini and Manfredi, 2014; Guschanski and Onaran, 2020; Michaels et al., 2014; 
Stockhammer, 2017). 
Globalisation is captured using both the KOF de jure measure of financial and trade 
globalisation (Gygli et al., 2019). We focus primarily on financial globalisation as this is 
expected to have a more direct impact on financial assets, returns and wealth than trade. This 
is a composite index built from laws on investment restrictions, capital account openness, 
international investment agreements and international voice traffic. We prefer de jure measures 
as these, being policy variables, tend to be the most exogenous. We test the robustness of our 
results using other KOF indices of globalization.  
Regarding the direct measures of labour’s bargaining power, we use different variables 
for decentralised bargaining systems in the UK and USA versus the coordinated bargaining 
system in France based on the industrial relations literature (Jensen, 2006). In a decentralised 
system, wages are negotiated at the firm or company level (Ferreiro, 2004). In a coordinated 
or centralised system, bargaining over wages is coordinated at the sectoral or national level 
(Nikolka and Poutvaara, 2018). In the UK and USA, the bargaining power of labour depends 
on the power they have at the firm or company level and is therefore directly tied to whether 
they are unionised at the firm level. In a coordinated or centralised system, the state takes a 
more active role in regulating labour market conditions and industrial relations and collective 
bargaining coverage may be substantially higher than union density (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 
2001: 238). Therefore, the bargaining power of labour depends on the extent to which they are 
covered by the negotiations and regulations coordinated at the state level, for which collective 
bargaining coverage is a better measure. France, despite having one of the lowest union density 
rates in the OECD has a very high collective bargaining coverage and is widely considered to 
have more favourable industrial relations for labour. Therefore, union density in France does 
not capture the extent of labour’s bargaining power (Guschanski and Onaran, 2020).  
The effects of progressive taxation is measured by both the top marginal inheritance tax 
rate and the top marginal income tax rate, both of which are provided by WID.  
Public wealth is measured by the net wealth of the public sector as a ratio to net national 
income (Piketty & Zucman, 2014; Estevez-Bauluz, 2017). Net public wealth is the total value 
of assets (cash, housing, bonds, equities, etc.) owned by the general government sector (central 
government, state government, local government, and social security funds) minus its debts.  
Lastly, homeownership rates measure the percentage of all households that are owner 
occupied. 
 
4. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
 
Our empirical methodology takes a two-step process. We first estimate the impact of the 
components of wealth on the top 1% wealth share (Model I). After finding that the top 1% 
income share is a significant determinant of wealth inequality, we then estimate the impact of 
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the deep determinants on the top 1% wealth share and income share. We do this to analyse 
whether the deep determinants have a direct impact on wealth inequality or whether they are 
impacting wealth via the income distribution. We estimate three different specifications for 
Model II, including top inheritance tax rates (Model IIA), public wealth (Model IIB) and 
homeownership rates (Model IIC) alternatively.  
We estimate both models using a SVAR for each country, for three reasons. Firstly, unlike 
an ARDL, the SVAR approach models the feedback effects of income inequality and wealth 
inequality on the deep determinants in addition to the interlocking relationships between the 
components and deep determinants. Secondly, we do not have a sufficient number of countries 
to estimate a panel data model as long-term time series data for wealth distribution exists only 
for the UK, the USA and France. Lastly, rather than finding average effects across the three 
countries in a panel SVAR, the small number of countries makes it possible to explicitly 
compare cross country differences in the estimated parameters.  
According to Kilian and Lütkepohl (2017:196), “the central objective in structural VAR 
analysis is to quantify causal relationships in the data.” We do this by imposing short-run 
restrictions via a Cholesky Decomposition to identify mutually uncorrelated shocks. We can 
write the data generating process according to the following structural equation:10 
 
𝐵0𝒚𝒕 = 𝐵1 + 𝐵2𝒚𝒕−𝟏 + 𝐵3𝒚𝒕−𝟐 + 𝐶𝒖𝒕 
 
where 𝒚𝒕 is a K x 1 vector of a set of determinants; 𝐵𝑖  are the model coefficients, 𝑖 = 0,… , 𝑝 
which are interpreted in the same way as any normal OLS regressions coefficient;11 and 𝒖𝒕 is 
a K x 1 vector of structural shocks. Below we present 𝒆𝒕 = 𝐵0
−1𝒖𝒕 for each model, where 𝒆𝒕 
are the reduced-form errors for the underlying VAR and 𝐵0
−1 denotes the contemporaneous 
relationships between the variables.  
Theoretically, a Cholesky Decomposition imposes both a lower triangular matrix on 𝐵0 
and leaves the diagonal of C unrestricted in addition to restricting its off-diagonal elements to 
zero. Intuitively, this assumes that if a variable is ordered above another in the system, the 
variable above has a contemporaneous impact on all variables below without any 
contemporaneous feedback effects on it, i.e. the variables ordered above are 
contemporaneously exogenous to those below. We assume that the deep determinants of wealth 
are contemporaneously exogenous to wealth inequality and its components. This is because the 
channel through which wealth and income inequality influence technological change, industrial 
relations, taxes etc, is via a political channel that takes longer than a year to materialise. 
Economic wealth does not instantly create political power, as campaigns to influence public 
opinion or lobbying to change laws takes time to materialise effectively. The feedback effects 
should therefore only occur with a lag.  
Regarding the relationship between the deep determinants themselves, as there is no 
theoretically justified ordering of the deep determinants, we follow the literature and report 
every possible ordering (Kloßner and Wagner, 2013; Henly and Wolman, 2011; Diebold and 
Yilmaz, 2009). Our baseline specification assumes that de jure globalisation and tax rates are 
 
10 As discussed in (Kilian and Lütkepohl, 2017, p. 219) there are three alternative representations of the SVAR model. We use 
what is commonly referred to as the AB model (the most general model). The alternative representations are to set C equal to 
the identity matrix (commonly referred to as the A model), or 𝐵0 equal to the identity matrix (commonly referred to as the B 
model). 
11 𝐵2 gives the partial effect of a one-unit shock of a lagged variable in vector 𝑦𝑡−1 on a dependent variable in vector 𝑦𝑡. 
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the most exogenous variables as these are slow moving policy variables. The orderings of the 
variables for each model are shown via the identification matrices in Figure 2 and 3.12  
 
Place Figure 2 here 
Place Figure 3 here 
 
These models are derived directly from the theoretical framework and the model 
coefficients 𝑏1, 𝑏2 etc capture specific subsets of the causal channels highlighted in Figure 1. 
For example, in Model I, 𝑏1 captures the contemporaneous impact of differential rate of returns 
on the top 1% share of income (arrow 1 in Figure 1).  
Moreover, we use the theoretical framework to meaningfully interpret the 
contemporaneous shocks of wealth inequality on itself, i.e. the last shocks in each model. In 
Model I, as we have data for personal income inequality and differential rates of return, the 
remaining components of wealth inequality - differential saving rates and top 1% net 
inheritance – are therefore captured by 𝑢2𝑡
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 & 𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘
. In Model IIA, this 
changes to 𝑢5𝑡
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 & 𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘
 as the deep determinants capture some of the 
effects of these components. The term ‘other’ therefore refers to the remaining shocks that are 
not caused by the deep determinants.  
In section 5 below on the estimation results, we present both orthogonalized structural 
impulse response functions (OIRF) and forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD). The 
OIRF plot the response of top wealth shares over time to a 1%-point increase in each 
determinant or component. The FEVD shows how much of the unconditional variance in top 
wealth shares is explained by each determinant or component over time.  
We estimate the SVAR models in levels with an intercept. Even if some of the variables 
are integrated of order one or potentially cointegrated, estimating an SVAR in levels with an 
intercept remains consistent, while imposing unit roots and/or cointegration restrictions when 
they do not actually hold leads to inconsistent estimates (Kilian and Lütkepohl, 2017:373).  
We present 95% confidence interval bands, using conventional residual-based bootstrap 
confidence intervals, which are more accurate in small samples than the standard asymptotic 
confidence intervals (Kilian and Lütkepohl, 2017:340). We include two lags in both models 
based on information criteria and autocorrelation tests, which are presented in Tables A3 and 
A4 in the online appendix. The models satisfy the eigenvalue stability condition and normality 
tests at the 1% significance level.  
Finally, we only analyse the results up to 11 years after the shock for both the OIRF and 
FEVD to keep the bootstrap inference valid (Kilian and Lütkepohl, 2017:377).  
 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
We first present the estimation results for the impact of the components of wealth on the 
top 1% wealth share based on Model I. We then report the effects of the deep determinants on 
top wealth shares.   
 
5.2. The effects of the components of wealth on the top 1% wealth share 
 
12 The identification matrices for Model IIB-C are presented in Figure A1 in the appendix. The identification matrices for all 




Figure 4 shows the effect of each component on the top 1% wealth share. These models 
are estimated for a common estimation period of 1919-2014 determined by data availability 
for all countries.  
We find that the top 1% income share has a statistically significant effect across all 
three countries.13 A one %-point shock to the top income share leads to an increase in the top 
wealth share by 0.8 to 1.4 %-points after 10 years. On the other hand, shocks to differential 
rates of return only have a statistically significant effect on top wealth shares in the USA. 
Lastly, shocks to differential saving rates and top 1% inheritances have a statistically 
significant effect on wealth inequality across all three countries.  
The relative importance of each of these shocks are shown in the FEVD in Table 1 
below. In all three countries, in the first 5 years, the variation in top wealth shares is largely 
explained by differential saving rate and top inheritance effects. However, after 5 years, shocks 
to income inequality play an increasingly important role, explaining 15-40% of the variation 
in top wealth shares after 11 years. Shocks to differential rates of return on the other hand are 
insignificant in the UK and France and are therefore not included in the further specifications 
below. 
 
Place Figure 4 here 
Place Table 1 here 
 
5.3. The effects of the deep determinants on top wealth shares  
 
This section presents Model IIA-C which introduces the deep determinants of top 
wealth shares to the model along with the top 1% income share. Differential rate of returns are 
dropped as they are insignificant in the UK and France. These models are estimated for the 
period of 1970-2014.14  
The OIRF results from Model IIA, which includes top marginal tax rate on inheritance, 
is presented in Figure 5. The main finding is that across all three countries, shocks to labour’s 
bargaining power are significant and lead to a decline in top 1% wealth shares. In the UK and 
the USA, a 1%-point increase in union density leads to a 0.34 %-point and 0.42%-point decline 
in top wealth shares after 10 years, respectively. In France, a 1%-point increase in collective 
bargaining coverage leads to a much bigger drop in top wealth shares in the short run (1.6 %-
points after 3 years), although the impact is less persistent and dies out by the 10th year. This 
result is robust to all alternative orderings of the deep determinants, as reported in Figure A4 
in the online Appendix. 
The impact of technological change on top wealth shares is only significant in the USA, 
where a 1%-point increase in ICT capital intensity leads to a 1.9%-point increase in top wealth 
shares after 10 years.15 One potential explanation for this variable being significant in only the 
USA and not the other countries is that, as the USA is home to the headquarters of the largest 
 
13 We test whether re-ordering income inequality and wealth inequality with respect to each other changes the results. As 
shown in Figure A3, shocks to top 1% income leads to a decline in top wealth shares in both cases, regardless of the order.  
14 1970 is the first year of data available for the ICT capital intensity series and the KOF index. 
15 To put this into perspective, ICT capital intensity ratio in the USA increased from 0.8% in 1970 to 10.5% in 2014, so a 1%-
point change is roughly a 10th of the variation of the variable over the sample.  
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ICT companies in the world, the top 1% is populated by the owners and top managers of these 
companies who particularly benefit from the growth of ICT capital.  
A shock to de jure financial globalisation is insignificant across all countries. As a 
robustness test, we re-estimate Model IIA replacing financial globalisation with a measure of 
trade globalisation, with the results presented in Figure A5. While trade globalisation is 
marginally more significant than financial globalisation, we find that the impact of labour’s 
bargaining power remains significant across all three countries.  
Lastly, shocks to top inheritance tax rates are insignificant in all three specifications. 
We test to see whether replacing top inheritance tax rates with top income tax rates give the 
same result in Figure A6. A shock to top income tax rates does lead to a decline in top wealth 
shares in the UK but remains insignificant in the USA and France. The only variable that 
remains significant across all three countries is the direct measure of labour’s bargaining 
power.  
Why are the effects of globalisation, technology and progressive taxes on top wealth 
shares relatively insignificant, given the existing theoretical literature? As discussed in the 
theoretical framework, top marginal tax rates can reduce inequality by taxing away the rents at 
the top of the distribution, and therefore dampening the willingness of capitalists and top 
earners to bargain with labour. However, this bargaining channel might already by captured by 
the direct measure of bargaining power included in the regression. To test this, we re-estimate 
the system dropping all variables from the model except top inheritance tax rates, top income 
shares and top wealth shares. The results, as presented in Figure A7, show that the effect of a 
shock to top inheritance tax rates become significant in the UK and the USA after 8 lags, 
although it stays negative for France.16 This suggests that inheritance tax rates are having some 
impact on top wealth shares via the bargaining channel. 
A similar problem of multicollinearity between globalisation and technological change 
might also be driving the insignificance of these variable, as globalisation and technological 
change are expected to increase inequality through the same channel (namely via labour saving 
and skill biased structural change). We re-estimate two more specifications, dropping 
globalisation and technological change respectively, with the results presented in Figure A8 
and A9. There are no significant changes to the results. De jure globalisation is insignificant in 
the USA and France, technological change is only significant in the USA and labour’s 
bargaining power is robust – remaining significant across all three countries.  
 
Place Figure 5 here 
 
Given that in the UK and the USA there are competing factors driving top wealth shares, 
it is useful to look at the FEVDs in Table 2 which shows how much of the variation in top 
wealth shares is explained by each shock. The results corroborate the finding that the most 
significant determinant of top wealth shares is labour’s bargaining power. In the UK, USA and 
France, shocks to labour’s bargaining power explains 42%, 10% and 32% of the variation in 
top wealth shares respectively after 11 years. The only other deep determinant that explains top 
wealth shares is technology shocks in the USA, which explains 20% of the variation in top 
wealth shares after 11 years.  
 
 
16 Interestingly, we find that top rate income taxes also become significant once the other variables in the system are dropped.  
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Place Table 2 here 
 
Through which channel does labour’s bargaining power impact wealth inequality? The 
theoretical framework highlights three potential channels: (i) a production channel via 
differential rate of return and personal income inequality; (ii) a bargaining channel via personal 
income inequality; and (iii) a pension channel via the differential saving rate. We find evidence 
in favour of the bargaining channel via personal income inequality across all three countries. 
We test the significance of this channel directly by analysing the impact of labour’s bargaining 
power on the top 1% income share in Figure 6. A positive shock to labour power leads to a 
significant decline in top 1% income shares across all three countries. Given the insignificance 
of differential rates of returns, at least in the UK and France, this effect must be captured by 
the bargaining channel.  
 
Place Figure 6 here 
 
We also estimate the extent to which the impact of labour power on wealth inequality 
is due to income inequality or differential savings rates/inheritances. Comparing Model IIA to 
Model I, we see that there is a decline in both the explanatory power of income inequality and 
differential saving rates/inheritances once we include the deep determinants. This means that 
the deep determinants – and labour’s bargaining power in particular17 - are causing changes in 
wealth inequality via their impact on income inequality and savings/inheritances.  
Given the insignificance of top rate inheritance tax rates in Model IIA, we now replace 
this variable with another fiscal indicator: the net public wealth as a ratio to national income. 
We find, as shown in Figure 7 below, that a shock to public wealth is only significant in the 
UK and France (and much more so in the latter) while in the USA it is insignificant. 
Interestingly, as the shock to public wealth leads to a decline in top 1% wealth shares, this 
provides initial evidence against the precautionary savings channel and in favour of the 
bargaining or windfall channel discussed above.  
A potential explanation for the cross-country differences is the different composition 
of net public wealth in the three countries. In France, public wealth tends to be held in the form 
of assets that ultimately provide public services that increase the bargaining power of French 
workers – hospitals, schools etc. In the USA, and to some extent the UK, the composition of 
state assets and spending is more skewed towards military assets that do not have the social 
wage character (Lin et al, 2013).  Therefore, despite all countries seeing a decline in net public 
wealth/national income ratios from around 50-100% in the 1970s to close to 0 today, this has 
only led to an increase in top wealth shares in the UK and France, where it might have 
potentially affected labour’s bargaining power. One potential corroboration of this finding is 
that if we replace net public wealth/national income in the USA with government spending on 
individuals/GDP, which would partly capture the governments provision of a social wage, the 
relationship between government spending and top 1% share of wealth becomes significant 
and negative, as can be seen in Figure A10.  
 
Place Figure 7 here 
 
 
17 As labour’s bargaining power is the only significant deep determinant across all three countries. 
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The last empirical question of this paper is to test whether the homeownership rate has 
an impact on top wealth shares. We do this by estimating Model IIC, which replaces the 
inheritance tax rates with a homeownership rate variable. As can be seen in Figure 8, the effect 
of an increase in homeownership rates on the top 1% wealth share is insignificant in all three 
countries. The effect of a positive shock to labour’s bargaining power on top wealth shares 
however remains robust across all three countries.  
 
Place Figure 8 here 
 
One potential issue due to the short time series dimension of the data is the low degrees of 
freedom in model II, where we estimate 18 parameters (6 variables with two lags) with only 
44 observations in the sample for each country. To test that this is not a problem driving our 
main results, we estimate three alternative versions of the model with fewer variables reported 
in the online Appendix, excluding both inheritance taxes and technology in Figure A8, 
excluding both inheritance taxes and globalisation in Figure A9, and excluding just inheritance 
tax rates in Figure A11. The significant impact of labour’s bargaining power on wealth 
inequality remains robust across all specifications, and we conclude that the low degrees of 
freedom is not driving the results. Furthermore, we also find that the effect of public wealth on 
wealth inequality is robust even in a smaller system where we drop labour’s bargaining power 




 This paper analyses the determinants of the top 1% wealth share in the UK, the USA and 
France based on the effects of the components and the deep determinants of wealth inequality 
using structural vector autoregression (SVAR) estimations for the periods of 1919-2014 and 
1970-2014. With respect to the components of wealth inequality, we find that a positive shock 
to the top 1% share of income significantly increases top 1% share of wealth across all three 
countries. Differential rates of returns on the other hand only have a significant impact on top 
wealth shares in the USA. This raises the question regarding the deeper drivers of wealth 
inequality and how it relates to the determinants of income inequality widely discussed in the 
literature. 
The results indicate that the bargaining power of labour is the most significant and robust 
deep determinant of the top 1% wealth share across all the models and countries, shown by a 
significant negative impact of an increase in union density or collective bargaining coverage 
on top wealth shares. Quantitatively, labour’s bargaining power explains 42%, 11% and 32% 
of the variation in top wealth shares in the UK, the USA and France respectively over the period 
of 1970-2014. We also show that the labour’s bargaining power influences wealth inequality 
via income inequality. 
Furthermore, we find that a decline in public wealth increases wealth inequality in the UK 
and France, but not in the USA. This is consistent with the expectation that a decline in public 
wealth reduces the bargaining power of labour and provides a windfall gain for the top 1%. On 
the other hand, we find that homeownership rates do not have a significant impact on the top 
1% wealth share in any country. 
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Lastly, top marginal income tax rates lead to a decline in top wealth shares in the UK but 
are insignificant in the USA and France, while the effect of top marginal inheritance tax rates 
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Figure 1.  The contemporaneous causal relationships between the components and deep 
determinants of the top 1% wealth share.  
Notes: Circles in the main figure denote the components of wealth inequality. Rectangles 
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Figure 4. Orthogonalized impulse response function: effects of components of wealth on the top 1% wealth 
share 
Note: Sample period: 1919-2014. Solid blue line: orthogonalized impulse response function. Blue dotted line: the residual-based 95% level bootstrapped 
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Figure 5. Orthogonalized impulse response function: effects of deep determinants with top inheritance tax rate 
on the top 1% wealth share  
Notes: Sample period: 1970-2014. Solid blue line: orthogonalized impulse response function. Blue dotted line: the residual-based 95% level bootstrapped 
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Figure 6. Orthogonalized impulse response function: effects of deep determinants with top inheritance tax rate 
on the top 1% income share  
Notes: Sample period: 1970-2014. Solid blue line: orthogonalized impulse response function. Blue dotted line: the residual-based 95% level bootstrapped 
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Figure 7. Orthogonalized impulse response function: effects of deep determinants with net public wealth on top 
1% wealth share 
Notes. Sample period: 1970-2014. Solid blue line: orthogonalized impulse response function. Blue dotted line: the residual-based 95% level bootstrapped 
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Figure 8. Orthogonalized impulse response function: effects of deep determinants with homeownership rates on 
the top 1% wealth share 
Notes: Sample period: 1970-2014. Solid blue line: orthogonalized impulse response function. Blue dotted line: the residual-based 95% level bootstrapped 
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of return  
Other shocks to top 
1% income share 
Differential saving 
rates and top 1% 
inheritance 
UK 
1 5 1 93** 
7 8 14 78** 
11 8 29** 64** 
USA 
1 28** 21** 51** 
7 34** 35** 30** 
11 32** 42** 26** 
France 
1 0 1 99** 
7 2 8 90** 
11 2 15 83** 























and top 1% 
inheritance 
UK 
1 11 3 1 5 0 80** 
7 6 8 4 5** 3 43** 
11 5 7 5 42** 4 37** 
USA 
1 0 0 13 2 53** 31** 
7 6 1 1 5 49** 24** 
11 7 1 20* 10* 41** 20** 
France 
1 0 2 0 11 10 76** 
7 0 10 0 33** 1 55** 
11 0 10 0 32** 2 54** 
Note: * is significant at 90% level | ** is significant at 95% level. In the USA, “other shocks to top 1% income 






Online Appendix: SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
 
TABLE A1 
Data: The components of the top 1% wealth share 
 




Top 1% share of net personal 
wealth (%) 
Net personal wealth (housing, land, deposits, 
bonds, equities, etc.) held by top 1% wealthiest 
individuals. 
WID  
UK 1895-2017 .3956 .1972 .152 .7377 
USA 1913-2016 .3202 .0718 .2101 .4824 
France 1902-2014 .3284 .1301 .1579 .569 
Top 1% share of personal 
income (%) 




UK 1918-2019 .1362 .0510 .0692 .237 
USA 1913-2019 .1642 .0310 .1103 .215 
France 1915-2017 .1275 .0447 .0733 .2327 
Differential rate of return (%) 
The real total return on equities minus the real 
total return on housing. Total real return is sum 
of the change in the price of asset plus the yield 
return of asset divided by the CPI (i.e. the 
yearly change in the general price level). 
JSTdatasetR4 (Release 4, 
May 2019) 
UK 1896-2015 .0020 .0299 -.1061 .1074 
USA 1896-2015 .0013 .0137 -.0376 .0462 










Data: The deep determinants of the top 1% wealth share 
Variable Name Description Source  Period Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Real ICT Capital Intensity 
(%)  
National real ICT capital stock divided by real gross value added.  
 
EU KLEMS 
UK 1970-2015 .0362 .0260 .0043 .0719 
USA 1970-2015 .0429 .0325 .0083 .1053 
France 1970-2015 .0496 .0241 .0055 .0922 
Financial globalisation de 
jure (KOF) (Index 0-100) 
De jure index of financial globalisation from KOF. The index is 
constructed from four variables: investment restrictions; capital account 
openness; international investment agreements; and international voice 
traffic. 
Gygli et al (2019) 
UK 1970-2017 81.34 12.70 39.85 93.18 
USA 1970-2017 72.78 11.75 57 90.7 
France 1970-2017 75.71 10.81 41.85 90.42 
Trade globalisation de jure 
(KOF) 
(Index 0-100) 
De jure index of trade globalisation from KOF. The index is 
constructed from four variables: trade regulations; trade taxes; tariffs; 
and trade agreements. 
Gygli et al (2019) 
UK 1970-2017 87.367 5.74 75.06 97.11 
USA 1970-2017 75.61 8.84 62.63 88.17 
France 1970-2017 86.36 5.36 77.12 95.78 
Trade union density 
(%) 
The proportion of total employees who are members of a trade union 
across the whole economy.  
OECD, Bain and Price 
(1980), Freeman 
(1998), Ebbinghaus 
and Visser (2000)  
UK 1895-2018 .31465 .1148 .0907 .522 
USA 1895-2018 .1695 .0799 .0379 .3222 




Percentage of employees with the right to bargain. OECD  
UK 1960-2017 .5698 .2147 .26 .85 
USA 1960-2017 .2060 .0748 .115 .34 
France 1960-2014 82.26 16.99 50 98.5 
Top marginal income tax rate 
(%) 
The maximum amount of tax paid on an additional unit of income for 
highest income earners. 
WID 
UK 1909-2017 .5953 .3023 0 .98 
USA 1900-2017 .5150 .2940 0 .94 
France 1915-2017 .480 .220 0 .72 
Top marginal inheritance tax 
rate 
(%) 
The maximum amount of tax paid on an additional unit of inheritance 
for the highest inheritances. 
WID  
UK 1900 -2017 .5098 .2306 .08 .85 
USA 1900-2017 .4954 .2692 0 .77 
France 1900-2017 .2537 .1206 .02 .45 
Net Public Wealth to Net 
National Income Ratio 
(%) 
The net wealth of the public sector as a proportion of net national 
income. 
Piketty & Zucman 
(2014), Estevez-
Bauluz (2017) 
UK 1970-2015 .5176 .3800 -.2428 1.0879 
USA 1970-2015 .3015 .2131 -.1705 .6374 




Government spending on individuals as a proportion of GDP. OECD 
UK 1970-2019 .1085 .0140 .0823 .1372 
USA 1970-2019 .0605 .0027 .0552 .0676 
France 1970-2019 .1351 .0164 .09752 .1569 
Homeownership rate 
(%) 
Percentage of all households that are owner occupied. 
GOV.UK, Kohl 
(2017) and INSE 
UK 1939-2018 .5336 .1429 .32 .7088 
USA 1950-2019 .6279 .0540 .436 .69 




Post-estimation tests for Model I 
Residual Autocorrelation Test 
Country lag chi2 df  Prob>chi2 
UK 1 28.10406 9  0.000916 
 
2 26.45002 9  0.001724 
USA 1 13.28396 9  0.150173 
 
2 3.346059 9  0.948982 
France 1 33.30852 9  0.000118 
 
2 8.570607 9  0.477816 
 
Normality Tests 
Country Skewness test Skewness chi2 df Prob > chi2 
UK Differential rate of returns 0.392086 2.434077 1 0.11 
 top 1% income share -0.03968 0.024934 1 0.87 
 top 1% wealth share 0.213581 0.722265 1 0.39 
 all  3.181275 3 0.36 
      
USA Differential rate of returns 0.426208 3.057832 1 0.08 
 top 1% income share -6.6E-05 7.3E-08 1 0.99 
 top 1% wealth share -0.20901 0.735394 1 0.39 
 all  3.793227 3 0.285 
      
France Differential rate of returns -0.89933 12.40141 1 0.00 
 top 1% income share -0.23015 0.81217 1 0.36 
 top 1% wealth share -0.40726 2.543154 1 0.11 
 all  15.75673 3 0.00 
 
Information Criteria Model II 
Country lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
UK 0 480.9292    8.57E-09 -10.0617 -10.0291 -9.98102 
 
1 882.9666 804.0748 9 2.8E-167 2.18E-12 -18.3361 -18.2058 -18.0135* 
 
2 894.668* 23.40279* 9 0.005352 2.07E-12* -18.393* -18.1649* -17.8285 
USA 0 713.2021    1.57E-10 -14.0634 -14.032 -13.9857 
 
1 954.868 483.3316 9 2.13E-98 1.56E-12 -18.6707 -18.5449 -18.3599* 
 
2 970.009* 30.28203* 9 0.000393 1.39E-12* -18.7923* -18.5721* -18.2485 
France 0 318.5939    2.1E-07 -6.86074 -6.82755 -6.7785 
 
1 593.6516 550.1155 9 1.1E-112 6.47E-10 -12.6446 -12.5118 -12.3157* 
 
2 609.7176* 32.13198* 9 0.000189 5.56E-10* -12.7982* -12.5659* -12.2226 
   
 
Stability Test – Modulus of Eigenvalues 
UK 0.983739 0.983739 0.417194 0.417194 0.338199 0.016375 
USA 0.963044 0.585436 0.576906 0.516489 0.516489 0.196651 






Postestimation tests for Model II 
Residual Autocorrelation Test 
Country lag chi2 df  Prob>chi2 
UK 1 42.15555 36  0.222019 
 2 38.98685 36  0.33693 
USA 1 41.67041 36  0.237682 
 2 40.41966 36  0.281344 
France 1 28.75545 36 0.799214 28.75545 
 2 31.78312 36 0.669434 31.78312 
 
Normality Tests 
Country Skewness test Skewness chi2 df Prob > chi2 
UK globalisation 0.465253 1.587374 1 0.20 
 public wealth -0.81615 4.884795 1 0.02 
 ICT capital intensity -0.10634 0.082929 1 0.77 
 Union density 0.115945 0.098583 1 0.75 
 top 1% income share 0.277094 0.56306 1 0.45 
 top 1% wealth share 0.138401 0.14047 1 0.70 
 all  7.357211 6 0.28 
      
USA globalisation 0.245753 0.442895 1 0.50 
 public wealth -0.16664 0.203638 1 0.65 
 ICT capital intensity 0.008623 0.000545 1 0.98 
 Union density 1.297805 12.35152 1 0.00 
 top 1% income share -0.01131 0.000938 1 0.97 
 top 1% wealth share 0.107885 0.085354 1 0.77 
 all  13.08489 6 0.04 
      
France globalisation -1.03123 7.621338 1 0.00 
 public wealth 0.013593 0.001324 1 0.97 
 ICT capital intensity -0.26667 0.509644 1 0.473 
 collective bargaining 0.91878 6.049787 1 0.01 
 top 1% income share -0.36237 0.941068 1 0.33 
 top 1% wealth share 0.632359 2.865792 1 0.09 
 all  17.98895 6 0.01 
 
Information Criteria Model II 
Country lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
UK 0 367.4288    2.95E-15 -16.4286 -16.3384 -16.1853 
 1 685.7991 636.7405 36 5.7E-111 8E-21 -29.2636 -28.632 -27.5605* 
 2 742.5067* 113.4153* 36 6.07E-10 3.43E-21* -30.2049* -29.0319* -27.042 
USA 0 401.6662    6.23E-16 -17.9848 -17.8946 -17.7415 
 1 749.701 696.0695 36 3.4E-123 4.38E-22 -32.1682 -31.5366* -30.4651* 
 2 789.5278* 79.65371* 36 3.84E-05 4.04E-22* -32.3422* -31.1692 -29.1793 
France 0 171.6026    1.82E-11 -7.70245 -7.61182 -7.4567 
 1 529.9104 716.6156 36 1.9E-127 5.72E-18 -22.6935 -22.0591 -20.9733* 





Continued Table A4 
Stability Test – Modulus of Eigenvalues 
UK 0.963648 0.963648 0.846816 0.846816 0.838225 0.838225 
USA 0.963044 0.89426 0.89426 0.827934 0.827934 0.796221 










𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑒2𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 
𝑒3𝑡









𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑢3𝑡
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ
) 





𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐾𝑂𝐹)
𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝐶𝑇 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑒𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒











1 0 0 0 0 0
𝑏1 1 0 0 0 0
𝑏2 𝑏3 1 0 0 0
𝑏4 𝑏5 𝑏6 1 0 0
𝑏7 𝑏8 𝑏9 𝑏10 1 0





















𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑢5𝑡














𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝐶𝑇 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑒𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒











1 0 0 0 0 0
𝑏1 1 0 0 0 0
𝑏2 𝑏3 1 0 0 0
𝑏4 𝑏5 𝑏6 1 0 0
𝑏7 𝑏8 𝑏9 𝑏10 1 0





















𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑢5𝑡















𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝐶𝑇 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑒𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒











1 0 0 0 0 0
𝑏1 1 0 0 0 0
𝑏2 𝑏3 1 0 0 0
𝑏4 𝑏5 𝑏6 1 0 0
𝑏7 𝑏8 𝑏9 𝑏10 1 0





















𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑢5𝑡
















𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑒2𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 
𝑒3𝑡









𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ
𝑢3𝑡
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
) 





𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐾𝑂𝐹)
𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝐶𝑇 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑒𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒











1 0 0 0 0 0
𝑏1 1 0 0 0 0
𝑏2 𝑏3 1 0 0 0
𝑏4 𝑏5 𝑏6 1 0 0
𝑏7 𝑏8 𝑏9 𝑏10 1 0





















𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ
𝑢5𝑡













𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝐶𝑇 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑒𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒









1 0 0 0 0 0
𝑏1 1 0 0 0 0
𝑏2 𝑏3 1 0 0 0
𝑏4 𝑏5 𝑏6 1 0 0

















𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ
𝑢4𝑡












𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐾𝑂𝐹)
𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝐶𝑇 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑒𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒











1 0 0 0 0 0
𝑏1 1 0 0 0 0
𝑏2 𝑏3 1 0 0 0
𝑏4 𝑏5 𝑏6 1 0 0
𝑏7 𝑏8 𝑏9 𝑏10 1 0





















𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ
𝑢5𝑡








Identification Matrix for Figure A6 
(
𝑒1𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑒2𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 
𝑒3𝑡









𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ
𝑢3𝑡
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
) 
Identification Matrix for Figure A7 
(
𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐾𝑂𝐹)
𝑒𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
) = [
1 0 0 0
𝑏1 1 0 0
𝑏2 𝑏3 1 0










𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑢3𝑡
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𝑒𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
) = [
1 0 0 0
𝑏1 1 0 0
𝑏2 𝑏3 1 0
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𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒











1 0 0 0 0 0
𝑏1 1 0 0 0 0
𝑏2 𝑏3 1 0 0 0
𝑏4 𝑏5 𝑏6 1 0 0
𝑏7 𝑏8 𝑏9 𝑏10 1 0
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𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒









1 0 0 0 0 0
𝑏1 1 0 0 0 0
𝑏2 𝑏3 1 0 0 0
𝑏4 𝑏5 𝑏6 1 0 0
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𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑝 1% 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒









1 0 0 0 0 0
𝑏1 1 0 0 0 0
𝑏2 𝑏3 1 0 0 0
𝑏4 𝑏5 𝑏6 1 0 0
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Figure A3. Orthogonalized impulse response function: effects of components of wealth on the top 1% 
wealth share years with wealth ordered after income  
Notes: Sample: 1970-2014. Solid blue line: orthogonalized impulse response function. Blue dotted line: the residual-based 95% level bootstrapped confidence 









0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10





0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10




0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10






0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10






0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10





0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10






0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10






0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10





0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10














Figure A4. Orthogonalized impulse response function: effects of deep determinants on top 1% wealth 
share with alternative ordering of deep determinants 
 
Notes: Sample: 1970-2014. Solid blue line: orthogonalized impulse response function. Blue dotted line: the residual-based 95% level bootstrapped confidence 
intervals. Legend: x axis: annual years / y axis: %-point change to the top 1% wealth share. The orderings of the variables (most exogenous, .. , most 
endoengous) are coloured according to the following codes:  
Yellow:  Globalisation, tax, technology, union 
Green: Tax, globalisation, tech, union 
Red: Globalisation, tax, union tech 
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Figure A5. Orthogonalized impulse response function: effects of deep determinants with trade 
globalisation on the top 1% wealth share 
 
Notes: Sample: 1970-2014. Solid blue line: orthogonalized impulse response function. Blue dotted line: the residual-based 95% level bootstrapped confidence 






0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10





0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10






0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10





0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10





0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10





0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10





0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10






0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10






0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10




0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10






0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
















Figure A6. Orthogonalized impulse response function: effect of deep determinants with top income 
tax rate on the top 1% wealth share  
 
Notes: Sample: 1970-2014. Solid blue line: orthogonalized impulse response function. Blue dotted line: the residual-based 95% level bootstrapped confidence 
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Figure A7. Orthogonalized impulse response function of institutional and structural variables on the 
top 1% wealth share with just inheritance tax rates 
Notes: Sample: 1970-2014. Solid blue line: orthogonalized impulse response function. Blue dotted line: the residual-based 95% level bootstrapped confidence 
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Figure A8. Orthogonalized impulse response function: effect of labour’s bargaining power and 
globalisation on the top 1% wealth share 
 
Notes: Sample: 1970-2014. Solid blue line: orthogonalized impulse response function. Blue dotted line: the residual-based 95% level bootstrapped confidence 
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Figure A9. Orthogonalized impulse response function: effect of labour’s bargaining power and 
technology on the top 1% wealth share 
Notes: Sample: 1970-2014. Solid blue line: orthogonalized impulse response function. Blue dotted line: the residual-based 95% level bootstrapped confidence 





Figure A10. Orthogonalized impulse response function: effects of deep determinants on the top 1% 
wealth share with government spending on individuals to GDP. 
Notes: Sample: 1970-2014. Solid blue line: orthogonalized impulse response function. Blue dotted line: the residual-based 95% level bootstrapped confidence 
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Figure A11. Orthogonalized impulse response function: effect of labour’s bargaining power, 
technology, globalisation on the top 1% wealth share 
Notes: Sample: 1970-2014. Solid blue line: orthogonalized impulse response function. Blue dotted line: the residual-based 95% level bootstrapped confidence 
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Figure A12. Orthogonalized impulse response function: effect of net public wealth, technology, 
globalisation on the top 1% wealth share 
Notes: Sample: 1970-2014. Solid blue line: orthogonalized impulse response function. Blue dotted line: the residual-based 95% level bootstrapped confidence 
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